This paper proposes a novel authentication protocol for wireless access security. Current symmetric key based authentication schemes are vulnerable to a variety of attacks such as the denialof-service attacks and the domino effect attacks, while public key based authentication schemes are costly. This paper designed a novel elliptic curve based authentication scheme that can avoid the certificate verification cost while still enjoys strong security properties of public key based schemes.
Figure 1. Trust Model in Wireless Network
To classify authentication schemes, we mention the following formal definition of wireless access authentication scheme.
Definition 1: ϑ is a wireless access authentication scheme if it has the following properties:
(1) Identity verification property: Upon receiving a message with the identity MNID , the NAS must be sure that MNID is an identity for MNs. It is assigned by the AS, and belongs to the MN who sends the message. Upon receiving a message with the identity NASID , the MN must be sure that NASID is an identity for NASes. It is assigned by the AS, and belongs to the NAS who sends the message.
(2) Key agreement property: The authentication process needs to generate a shared key for the NAS and the MN who are involved. This key should be known only by the NAS and the MN.
(3) Immune to domino effect [10] : Once a NAS is compromised, the attacker can not compromise other NASes using the compromised NAS' keying materials.
(4) Immune to DDoS attacks: In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough MNs (typically using a virus or worm) or NASes, and using those compromised hosts to perpetrate the attack. Such an attack is known as a Distributed Denial-ofService (DDoS) attack [9] . To avoid DDoS attacks, two-party wireless access authentication is preferred, in which only a small area of compromised hosts can be used for perpetrating DDoS attacks.
Security and efficiency analysis for current schemes
The fast base station transition (FBSST) scheme [2] is a typical symmetric key based authentication scheme that is vulnerable to both DDoS attacks and Domino effect attacks. It mainly includes two parts: the domain initialization process and the fast base station transition process. When the MN roams into the 802.11r domain, it establishes an 802.1X authentication process. After that, its root key PMK-R0 is deployed on the R0 key holder (R0KH) of the initial NAS (typically the first access point it is associated with). When the MN roams to other target NAS in the domain, it generates PMK-R1 from PMK-R0, signs messages using PMK-R1, and sends it to the R1 key holder (R1KH) deployed on the target NAS. The latter then requests PMK-R1 from the R0KH on the initial NAS. Finally, the target NAS and the MN authenticate each other using PMK-R1. Figure 2 shows the message exchanges of the over-the-air transition. The over-the-ds transition is similar. A little difference is that the current NAS (i.e. the current access point) is involved, and acts as a pass-through agent. The details of FBSST scheme can be found in [2] . This scheme requires four messages. Referring to [2] , messages between the STA and the R1KH are provided with integrity protection, while messages between the R1KH and the R0KH are provided with both integrity and confidentiality protection. The difference between the FBSST scheme and other Kerberos-like schemes is that the AS is not involved in the authentication process. This avoids the DDoS attacks aiming to the AS.
In the FBSST scheme, only when the R1KH gets message 3 from the R0KH, can it verify message 1. The significant implication of this drawback is that DDoS attack to the R0KH is possible. In general, a purely symmetric key based wireless access authentication scheme (e.g. [3] [6] [7] [8]) also suffers from this type of DDoS attack because the target NAS cannot discriminate legitimate requests from requests coming from DDoS attackers (to R0KH on the initial NAS). In other words, the third party (R0KH on the initial NAS) has to be involved for each online authentication request (authentic or false). The DDoS attacks become easier in large domains, where the attackers may perpetrate DDoS attacks using a variety of compromised MNs. In this case, the network becomes unavailable for performing authentication, which leads to revenue loss and service disruption.
The domino effect attack here refers to the fact that compromise of one NAS will lead to compromise of another. In the FBSST scheme, once a NAS in the 802.11r domain is compromised, the attackers can establish a successful FBSST process with other target NASes by setting the compromised NAS as its R0KH. Therefore, the FBSST scheme suffers from the domino effect attack. The Domino effect attack could be caused by compromise of any NAS. In this case, an attack can access to any NAS in the domain, which leads to revenue loss too.
Furthermore, the 802.11r document requires that the R0KHs need to establish trust relationships with the R1KHs in the 802.11r domain. Usually every access point (i.e. NAS) in the domain is deployed with one R0KH and one R1KH. Assuming there are ap n access points in the 802.11r domain, the total security associations between the R0KHs and the R1KHs will be
. So the deployment of security associations between R0KHs and R1KHs will be impossible for large domains.
Since symmetric key based authentication schemes are vulnerable to a variety of attacks, public key based schemes are desirable to provide strong security properties. [11] designed a public key based two-party authenticated key agreement protocol, in which the two parties involved in the authentication process exchange their public-key certificates together with their Diffie-Hellman public key, and the messages are signed using their private keys.
As the authentication process is done between two parties, the Domino effect and DDoS attacks are avoided. However, since the two parties need to exchange certificates, they must first verify certificates of each other. This will add additional computation cost to the authentication process. Furthermore, certificate based authentication schemes do not discriminate NASes from MNs, a MN may declaim itself to be a NAS, and establish a successful authentication process with other MNs. In this case, other MNs will not be able to access networks even after successful authentication.
Proposed EBAF scheme
In this section, we present the proposed EBAF scheme, which includes three independent parts: EBAF initialization protocol, EBAF authentication protocol, and an optional revocation protocol.
1. EBAF initialization protocol
The AS initializes the EBAF domain parameters by creating an elliptic curve T over the finite field p F
, with a domain base point G and a prime order n using the technique defined in [12] (In this paper, we roughly assume n and p are the same bits in length). Then the AS randomly generates two 
M G < >
as its own key pair. When a NAS in the domain wants to register for EBAF support, the AS initializes the NAS as follows:
Step 1) The AS randomly generates a number n j Z ∈ , that satisfies 1 j ≠ . Since gcd( , ) 1 j n = , 1 mod j n − exists and can be computed using the extended Euclid's algorithm [13] . Then the AS computes 1 ( mod ) ; mod
Step 2) The AS sends 
constructs the key pair of the NAS with the base point
The MN initialization process is similar to the NAS initialization process. When a MN requests for EBAF support, the AS initializes the MN as follows:
Step 1) The AS randomly generates a number n r Z ∈ , that satisfies 1 r ≠ . Since gcd( , ) 1 r n = , 1 mod r n − exists and can be computed using the extended Euclid's algorithm [13] . Then the AS 
2. EBAF authentication protocol
Before authentication, we assume that the MN has already created its Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair 1 1 , x y < > in which 1 x is the private key and 1 y is the public key, and the NAS has already created its Diffie-Hellman public-private key pair 2 2 , x y < > in which 2 x is the private key and 2 y is the public key. The EBAF authentication process is described as follows: 
3. EBAF revocation protocol
In this subsection, we'll show how to revoke a NAS. The MN revocation process is similar. The NASes can be seen as a set of network entities that holds private keys corresponding to the shared public key. So the revocation process can be done by changing the shared public key. However, if the shared public key is changed, other non-revoked NASes has to change their private key too. To address this, all the NASes can be organized as a group. The AS is the group manager, and it manages the NASes' shared group key using a group key management scheme (e.g. [14] 
Security and efficiency analysis
In this section, we shall analyze the authentication properties of the EBAF. More precisely, we shall prove that the EBAF scheme satisfies all the properties listed in Definition 1. And then we shall analyze the security strength of the EBAF scheme. Finally, we'll analyze the efficiency of EBAF. For the case of [11] , a certificate such as the X.509 certificate typically includes identity and public key of both the issuer and the certificate owner [1] . So its message length will be much longer than our sheme. Latency performance is an important metric for wireless access security as many services in wireless networks are normally for real-time applications. The latency comes from computation processing delays at MN and NAS, and message round-trip times between NAS and MN.
1. Security properties analysis
Compared with [2] and other symmetric key based schemes [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8], the latency reduction by EBAF is mainly due to overall smaller round-trip time on messages (i.e., a fewer number of messages) and smaller message length.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an elliptic curve based wireless access authentication scheme. It has stronger security properties than the symmetric key based schemes. After the initial key distribution, the MN and the target NAS can authenticate each other and establish a shared key without the participation of other NASes or the AS. Since the MNs in the domain
